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The Cunning of Architecture’s Reason
Mark Jarzombek
Foreword
This paper starts by asking a rather simple question 
about architecture and its modernity. In what way 
do we put these two terms together? I will not talk 
about Modernism-the-style, or about the history of 
industrialisation, but about the philosophical foun-
dation of the question. When did philosophy deﬁ ne 
what we call the modern? This is usually answered 
by pointing to the Enlightenment, and to Reason 
and its instrumentalities, in science and capitalism 
(usually perceived in a negative way, if we can think 
perhaps of Theodor Adorno). Translated into archi-
tecture, this approach leads through Karl Marx to 
a separation between capitalist architecture and an 
architecture from below, on the assumption that the 
latter is more authentic - and here we could think of 
Henri Lefebvre. Manfredo Tafuri, who also proposed 
a theory of architecture out of a critique of Reason, 
pointed to the emergence in the late eighteenth 
century of a utopian impulse that together with a 
crisis of subjectivity redeﬁ ned architecture in a way 
that would come to a head with the modernist move-
ment.1
I will stay within the framework of the Enlighten-
ment, but would like to commence with another type 
of Reason, namely with Hegel’s cunning Reason, a 
starting position that has the advantage that Hegel 
deals extensively with architecture, allowing us to 
trace the detailed activities of this cunning in regard 
to architecture. To ﬁ t the philosophical needs, 
architecture had to be thoroughly redeﬁ ned in rela-
tionship to then current humanist models, but once 
architecture’s position had been established philo-
sophically, Hegel demoted architecture in the name 
of the dialectic’s higher cultural aspiration. Architec-
ture, a type of victim of the cunning of Reason, was 
given metaphysical content, but not a metaphysical 
purpose. In this paper I try to partially deconstruct 
the modernity that is disguised within this manipula-
tion.
1.
In 1951 in Darmstadt when Martin Heidegger ﬁ rst 
gave the lecture, ‘Bauen Wohnen Denken’, the 
architects in the crowd, Hans Scharoun among 
them, could hardly restrain their enthusiasm, and 
when, in 1971, the text was published in an English 
translation, its success was a foregone conclusion.2
The excitement it generated - and one cannot deny 
its lure even today - was based on the rather simple 
historical fact that this was the ﬁ rst time in over a 
century that a major philosopher had expressed 
himself directly on the subject of architecture. 
Though the sparkle of this philosophical engage-
ment with architecture has waned in recent years, 
its after-effects are still felt today. It is not impor-
tant in this respect who may or may not have been 
inﬂ uenced by Heidegger. Rather, after Heidegger, 
all architecture, philosophically speaking, under-
went a transformation. The question is not how 
did Heidegger change architectural practice, but 
what is architecture as a philosophical project after 
Heidegger?3
To answer that question, we have to turn to the 
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moment when architecture - and more precisely 
architecture’s history - ﬁ rst became a philosophi-
cal issue to begin with, namely in Georg Friedrich 
Hegel’s ‘Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik’ (1832).4
It could easily be seen in which way Heidegger 
undermined the Hegelian tradition, but I will argue 
that instead he brought a type of closure to Hegel 
on the subject of architecture. What I mean by 
‘closure’ - which has, of course, a speciﬁ c architec-
tural referentiality - is the subject of this paper since 
it was Hegel who made the theme of ‘en-closure’ 
so central to the question of architecture to begin 
with. But instead of interpreting Hegel’s deﬁ nition 
of architecture from the outside in, with the usual 
pronouncements about the status of Idealism and 
its remoteness from reality, I will work from inside 
out to show a sub-text that is, as I see it, a complex 
preﬁ guring – though certainly unintentional - of the 
modern architectural problematic.
2.
It is to be expected, given the time period in which 
Hegel was writing, that a discussion of architec-
ture starts with a discussion of its beginnings, but 
these beginnings, for Hegel, are by no means 
simple, and certainly far more complex than imagin-
ing architecture’s historical or mythical origins.5 In 
fact, long before the chapter on architecture in his 
‘Vorlesungen’, Hegel has engaged the subject of 
the philosophy, religion and art again and again, to 
interlace these issues and to avoid at all cost the 
appearance of ‘storytelling’.6 For this reason, he 
rejects the argument of Laugier - that ‘newfangled 
French, philosophizing expert’, (borrowing some 
choice words from Goethe) - pointing out that Laugi-
er’s claim that ramming ‘four sticks in the ground’ 
can in no way rise to the level of true philosophy.7
He argues that we also have to look past the diverse 
ﬁ elds of empirical particulars, and in this he was 
clearly resisting the archaeological tendencies of 
the age. And ﬁ nally, he warns against the tendency 
to envision man and architecture as separate and 
distinct, with man, in the name of divinity, exercising 
his will over the material world.8 This type of duality 
presupposes that architecture exists before its true 
purpose, so Hegel argued, has been determined.
Instead, to get to the true beginnings, we have to 
look, according to Hegel, not at the concrete world, 
but at a point in conceptual time where the ‘differ-
ence between man and building did not yet arise’,9 
namely when architecture ﬁ rst served ‘to stimulate 
thought’.10 He describes this unity as ‘riddle-like’,11 
for it appears akin to the unity with the divine; that 
unity no longer exists, however, since the divine 
has retreated [zurückgezogen] from reality, gather-
ing its ‘ﬁ nitude into itself and elevating itself [sich 
erheben]’ over baser reality.12 It is as compensation 
for this Negativität, as Hegel calls it, that the dialectic 
launches itself on its inimitable course, creating as a 
consequence the impulse to art and architecture.13 
This conceptual - and a-historical - moment, once 
it had been established in the minds of mankind 
does not yield a simple series of art works as one 
might expect, but a protracted struggle between 
thought [Denken] and Imagination [Vorstellung],14
form [Gestalt] and meaning [Bedeutung],15 and inte-
riority and exteriority. The ﬁ rst art ‘to break a path’ 
through these entanglements and to attempt at least 
‘an adequate representation of the God-head’, so 
Hegel argues, was none other than architecture,16 
as it was the ﬁ rst art to attempt to ‘purify’ the inor-
ganic from its rote materiality.17 From this beginning, 
architecture develops into its own sphere, moving 
from the Symbolic Age to the Classical and then, 
ﬁ nally, to the Romantic age, which Hegel equates 
with Christianity. In this way, Hegel dispatches with 
the conventional, centuries-old, distinction between 
theory and practice and elevates architecture into 
something quite different, namely into a trope for 
the beginning of mankind’s history toward the self-
determinant Spirit. 
The building type that brings this history to a 
determining moment is the medieval cathedral, 
where the enclosure - Umschliessung - has been 
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placed in conceptual alignment with the building’s 
interior.18 The basic elements of this uniﬁ cation, for 
Hegel, were, of course, already present in ancient 
architecture. The Egyptian pyramids were all exteri-
ority whereas the subterranean labyrinths that they 
also built, all interiority.19 Even with the Greeks, 
exteriority and interiority were, according to Hegel, 
separate and distinct: the agora ﬁ lled with people, 
on the one hand, and the temple with its cella, on the 
other hand. The open was all open and the closed 
all closed. By the time of the medieval cathedral, 
however, interiority had become fully architectural. 
It was no longer perceived as inhabited by the 
deity alone, but as a ‘room for the whole popula-
tion [Volk]’.20 On the outside, the ‘entrance halls and 
colonnades’ that typiﬁ ed early Christian architecture 
and that cluttered its external image fell away, with 
the building rising ‘freely into the heights’,21 allowing 
those on the inside, ‘a concentration and elevation 
[Erhebung] of their thoughts’,22 an Erhebung that 
corresponds to the demands of the Geist. The result 
is what Hegel calls ‘a total enclosure’ [eine totale 
Umschliessung] - a world ‘made by man and man 
alone for his worship and his pre-occupations with 
his inner life’.23 In the broader scenario of Hegel’s 
philosophy, the cathedral, ﬁ lled with the pulse of life, 
serves as the jumping-off point for a discussion of 
a human interiority, or Innerlichkeit, ﬁ lled with the 
productions of the Spirit, namely the sculptures, 
paintings, poems and music that constitute the prin-
cipal expressions of the Spirit from here on out.
3.
The critical term, Umschliessung, or enclosure, 
appears throughout Hegel’s discussion of archi-
tecture and is also unique in his text to the history 
of architecture. Hegel traces what he sees as its 
historical origins to ancient caves used in cult prac-
tices in the form of an enclosing of ‘the image of the 
divine’.24 Though these caves are pure Umschlies-
sung, oriented to the interior with no externality 
to speak of, they are the dialectical predecessors 
of the walls and roofs that will eventually deﬁ ne 
Umschliessung in more proper architectural terms.25
It is no accident that the example Hegel mentions 
in this context is the Mithra cult where caves were 
used, so he points out, as the setting for the ritual 
puriﬁ cation or Reinigung of the soul. Umschlies-
sung, in other words, has a philosophical purpose 
in the early development of the dialectic that far 
transcends the need for security. 
But unlike the other arts, whose purpose in rela-
tionship to the Spirit was deﬁ ned as obvious, the 
architecture of Umschliessung had a long way to 
go to ﬁ nd itself. It became, as Hegel phrased it, a 
suchende Kunst, a searching art. The main problem 
was that externality and internality lay in different 
geographical and temporal places. But as a gerund, 
Umschliessung (‘an enclosing’) has no ﬁ xed – and 
as we shall see no predictable - physical attributes, 
and thus exists as a force, or Trieb,26 that can move 
from building to building and from material to mate-
rial in a series of paratactic transformations, from the 
inside surface of a cave, to the mud and stone walls 
of the Egyptians, all the way to the reﬁ ned complexi-
ties of the Gothic architectural system. As a gerund, 
Umschliessung also allows Hegel to break with the 
conventional discourse about the making of a build-
ing. There is, however, signiﬁ cantly, no speciﬁ c craft 
unique to Umschliessung. This allows it to over-
come the question of its disciplinarity in so far as it 
had to shake off its attachment to sculpture. For this 
reason it only came into its own after the Greeks. 
But from then on, starting with the Roman basilica, 
the root relationship between enclosure, interiority, 
and puriﬁ cation deﬁ nes the principle narrative of 
architecture’s development until it ends, ﬁ nally, in 
the complex forms of the medieval cathedrals. 
4.
The gesture of opening the doors of the history of 
philosophy to architecture turns out, however, to be 
an ambiguous one, for it becomes clear that even 
by the time of the cathedrals, architecture had still 
not achieved a true ‘free-standing existence’, but, as 
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Hegel clearly states, a mere impression [Eindruck] 
of it, that being all that is required at this particu-
lar moment in the development of the dialectic.27
Eindruck is here not a Platonic reduction of meta-
physical truth to representation. It is more optimistic 
and foreshadows the reality to come. Nonetheless, 
it is still only just a glimpse into the future. As a 
result, despite the advances one sees with these 
buildings, their interiors, for Hegel, were still deﬁ -
cient. ‘Here there is a sermon; there a sick man is 
brought in. Between the two a procession drags 
slowly on.’ As a result, ‘nothing ﬁ lls the building 
completely, everything passes quickly; individuals 
and their doings are lost and dispersed like points 
in this grandiose structure.’ Worshippers wander 
around ‘like nomads’, whereas above them, ‘these 
gigantic constructions rise in their ﬁ rm structure and 
immutable form’.28
What Hegel portrays is not an easy alliance 
between form and meaning; on the contrary, the 
two are in a high degree of tension; architecture can 
frame interiority, but it cannot in itself bring forth ‘the 
inner life as inner’.29 It can at best ‘symbolize it’,30 
and thus Hegel’s claim that even though architecture 
has a history that stretches into the Romantic - into 
the modern - it is an art form wedded to external-
ity, to Äusserlichkeit.31 As a consequence, the ‘true 
objectivity of representation’ that Hegel demanded 
of original art works is, in the ﬁ nal analysis, impos-
sible for architecture.32
5.
The ambiguity of architecture’s philosophical status 
is an unmistakable subtext even in the way Hegel 
frames architecture’s beginnings. Architecture, 
Hegel writes in the opening lines of his chapter on 
the subject, ‘is conceptually the beginning of art,’ yet 
in asking where architecture has begun ‘we must 
thoroughly exclude [ausschliessen] the empirical 
facts of history’.33 The reason for this is that only 
when stripped of its scholarly and non-philosophical 
modalities, can architecture provide an environment 
that can operate in the name of philosophy’s higher 
calling. Of all the arts, architecture is most clearly 
deﬁ ned by the rupture between the empirical and 
the philosophical, since it is precisely at the begin-
ning of history that empirical circumstances are at 
their most tenuous and yet potentially at their most 
meaningful. This rupture has undeniable implica-
tions. Architecture can never return to the empirical, 
even as a corrective. In order for architecture to be 
more than just a question of function, but part of 
the conceptual world of philosophy, it has to permit 
philosophy to strip it of empirical foundations. The 
fate of architecture lies completely in the hands of 
philosophy, and yet it becomes philosophical at the 
moment it becomes revisionist.
Another complication is introduced when Hegel 
argues that the ﬁ rst buildings are not architec-
ture pure and simple, but an awkward blend, or 
Ver mi schung, of architecture and sculpture.34 The 
pyramids, for example, are more sculpture than 
architecture. It is only in the Romantic Age, some 
three thousand years later, that architecture in the 
form of the cathedrals manages to purify itself of 
its sculpturality. The very moment architecture has 
matured into its proper sphere of activity, its history, 
from the philosophical point of view, at least, comes 
to a close. 
And in a last and most cutting twist - compared to 
architecture that in all its long history ‘labors to bring 
[itself] nearer to an expression of spirit’ - sculpture, 
when it begins the next phase of the development 
of Spirit, can do the same instantaneously; no 
thousands of years of having to accommodate the 
troublesome problems of gravity, materiality and 
Zweckmässigkeit. When sculpture appears - in the 
ﬁ rst sentence of the chapter on the subject, after the 
chapter on architecture - it is described as nothing 
less than ‘the miracle [Wunder] of Spirit’s giving to 
itself an image of itself’.35 A Wunder, according to 
Hegel, ‘enters directly upon what is purely external 
and particular, breaks it up, inverts it, makes it into 
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something completely different.’36 With sculpture, 
philosophy can ﬁ nally, and spectacularly, distance 
itself from its messy, and, one should emphasise, 
self-created, entanglements with architecture.
Architecture’s downfall - as the dialectic moves on 
to what it sees as higher art forms - is total. Archi-
tecture ‘the most incomplete of all arts’, as Hegel 
phrased it, remains, despite its vast history, and 
despite its prominent positioning at the beginning 
of the dialectic, a medium that in the ﬁ nal analysis 
is ‘incapable of portraying the Spirit in a presence 
adequate to it’.37
6.
Architecture is a pawn in the cunning of Reason, a 
cunning that was meant to explain the transcendence 
of Spirit; but that is, in the context of architecture, the 
slippery ground on which architecture’s modernity is 
based. Philosophy imparts to architecture a promi-
nence that no Humanist theorist of earlier centuries 
could have dreamt of, but it also entails a break 
from the discourse of practice to the philosophical, 
from the scholarly to the theoretical and from the 
history-of-buildings to a history-of-ideas. To unravel 
the consequence of this cunning - to see the puzzle 
within the puzzle - that is to where we have to turn 
our energies. 
7.
Let me ﬁ rst condense what I see happening. Archi-
tecture begins its life as a modern philosophical 
project by a series of alienations and forced detach-
ments from its presumptive disciplinary realities, 
realities that have enclosed and trapped it, accord-
ing to Hegel, in the narrow discourse of scholarship 
and ideology. Though freed to engage the philo-
sophical, architecture is denied an ongoing role in 
the advancement of metaphysics, has its origins in 
a competing artistic medium, has a philosophical 
history that is not related to its empirical history, and, 
ﬁ nally, becomes architecture at the very moment 
it becomes no longer relevant in the dialectic of 
History, namely in the shift from work to miracle. In 
other words, Hegel makes architecture into some-
thing one can call ‘not-architecture’: not a real 
building, but an ‘enclosure’, not an ancient building, 
but a ‘sculpture’; not a real history, but a conceptual 
one; not a free standing production, but the appear-
ance of one, and not a miracle of representation, 
but a labour that ends in a mere simulacrum.
I would like to argue that these dislocations still 
today haunt the architectural problematic. It is not 
the speciﬁ city of Hegel’s argument, nor even the 
trace of his considerable inﬂ uence in nineteenth 
and twentieth century aesthetics that I am talking 
about, but a more substantial claim about architec-
ture in general. The history of modern architecture 
- which is also the history-of-architecture-and-the-
crisis-of-its-modernity - has the shape of a history 
of not-architecture, the history of architecture being 
not itself. It ﬁ nds its ﬁ rst deﬁ nition in this respect in 
the writings of Hegel. And ﬁ nally, and most impor-
tantly, the history of post-Hegelian architecture 
- philosophically speaking - is the history of how 
architecture operates with and within the disasso-
ciations that were mandated by philosophy.
8.
Before I can elaborate on this historiographic 
premise - and attempt to bring to the fore the theory 
of modernity that is embedded within it - let me 
return to Heidegger, for he had hoped to dispense 
with the tradition of Hegelian aesthetics altogether. 
Unlike Hegel, who approaches the problem of 
beginning cautiously, on philosophical cat feet, 
Heidegger claims to see beginnings clearly. But it 
is not architecture that he is interested in but bauen
(to build), and even though in sidestepping the 
problem of architecture he bypasses the question of 
its civilisational narrative, bauen has a history all its 
own, one that derives from nothing less than ich bin, 
or ‘I am’.38 To explain this, Heidegger employs an 
onomatopoeic word game in which bauen is linked 
backward in time to buan (notice the shift in sylla-
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bles and missing e), then to bhu (note the lopping 
off of a syllabic unit), then to beo (note the shifting of 
the vowels) and then to bin. In this way, Heidegger 
arrives at the ﬁ rst words of creation, spoken by a 
mythological Black Forest farmer stomping around 
on his newly cleared ﬁ eld. Wife and children, and 
even the need for food, protection and clothing 
- some of the conventional arguments about the 
beginning of civilisation - are not yet in the picture. 
Nonetheless, out of the blunt syntactic eruption of 
ich bin, there emerges through its repetitions (this 
is, after all, the only thing the farmer can utter every 
time he needs to speak) a host of creative misspell-
ings and syllabic slips that over time develop into 
words like Bauer (farmer) and Nachbar, (neighbour) 
- and, of course, bauen thereby creating a social 
and spatial web around Being’s originary force.39
The historical development of Heideggerian 
‘Being’ is, however, two- sided, for as it becomes 
ever more historical, it also undergoes a series of 
‘distortions and over-paintings [Übermalungen]’ 
that ultimately ‘trivializes’ its presence.40 In other 
words, as one moves from ich bin to ich baue, and 
thus away from Being and toward the potential for 
social life, one is also at the mercy of the forgetful-
ness of language. In making a link between bauen
and Being, Heidegger thus asks us to realise in 
what way the word bauen had not only developed 
through time, in a positive sense, but had also been 
damaged by its eventual replacement, architec-
ture, which had produced not places in which ‘one 
dwells’, but rather an endless continuum of housing, 
factories, and highways. 
Despite Heidegger’s attempt to construct an alter-
native to Hegel’s civilisational history, his premise 
relies on Hegel in a very direct way. Following 
Hegel’s critique of scholarship, Heidegger argues 
that his (philosophical) history does not need history 
in the conventional, empirical sense. That type of 
history, Heidegger argues, ‘will petrify into fateless-
ness’.41 From Heidegger’s perspective, Hegel’s 
mistake, however, was that though he separated 
History from its empirical equivalency, he still had 
to adhere at some level to empirical veriﬁ cation, 
and this weighed philosophy down with discipli-
nary protocols that were not properly philosophical. 
Philosophy, thinking in Heideggerian lines, should 
use its critique of scholarship to invent a new type of 
history, one that could just as easily be a complete 
ﬁ ction. And what better way to prove the power of 
philosophy in this context than to show how some-
thing as hard and culturally grounded as architecture 
can succumb to something as ephemeral as a play 
on words.
9.
Hegel and Heidegger, when taken together, leave 
architecture without a place to go. For Hegel, 
modernity-as-history-of-Spirit becomes ever more 
metaphysically apparent, leaving architecture 
to become ever more entangled in the web of 
philosophy’s cunning. For Heidegger, modernity-as-
history is nothing more than background noise with 
architecture just another element in the inevitable 
downward slide. Articulated most cruelly, architec-
ture’s history is nothing less than the history of its 
erasure from the modernity-of-Spirit (Hegel) and its 
theory is nothing less than its equivalency with the 
negativities of modernity (Heidegger). If Hegel gave 
to architecture an internal struggle only to abandon 
it on the roadside of metaphysics, Heidegger sees 
architecture with not even the potential for dialecti-
cal redemption. It is a negative that like a cataract 
darkens ontological sight. It is difﬁ cult to tell - from 
an architectural point of view - which is the worst 
poison.
10.
Post-Hegelian philosophy has more often than not 
translated these implicit negativities into a project 
that can only be described as anti-architecture. The 
writings of Henri Lefebvre serve as an example. 
On the surface, Lefebvre moves well past Hegel 
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in shifting the discussions from a historical-philo-
sophical project to a social-philosophical one. For 
example, unlike Hegel’s Umschliessung with its 
emphasis on closure, Lefebvre discusses a window 
‘as a transitional object’, with ‘two senses, two 
orientations: from inside to the outside and from 
the outside to the inside’.42 Instead of looking at the 
wall, he looks through the wall; instead of seeing 
the separation between inside and outside as the 
mark of the philosophical, he sees the philosophical 
in the dynamic, social interchange between inside 
and outside.
And yet, even though Lefebvre wants to shift the 
terms to a social production of space, the lingering 
Hegelianism is all too noticeable. Lefebvre acknowl-
edges, for example, that an architect can create 
such ‘living spaces’ as the Taj Mahal, but he notes: 
‘We are not concerned here with architectural space 
understood as the preserve of a particular profes-
sion within the established social division of labor’.43
This elevation of a ‘living’ architecture from the 
strictures of practice - which is akin to the Hegelian 
notion of Umschliessung as an Erhebung over prac-
tice - quickly deteriorates into a polarity between 
what the philosopher can promise and the architect 
can deliver. He states, for example, that ‘it is the 
architect’s job to reproduce’ a ‘welcoming space’,44
but he goes on to claim that architects in actual-
ity do little more than manipulate signs to create an 
‘impression of intelligibility’.45 
His negativist reading of Hegel is also appar-
ent when he argues that because the Bauhaus 
expressed the ‘architectural requirements of state 
capitalism’, it, therefore, ‘fell to the painters … 
to reveal the social and political transformation 
of space’.46 Lefebvre then picks up Heidegger - 
despite his disavowal of Heidegger - to drive the 
stake into the heart of the matter. He claims that 
by the 1920s, because of what he calls ‘facadism’, 
architecture opened itself up to ‘total spectaculari-
zation’ (his emphasis).47 The medieval churches, by 
way of contrast, so he argues, were not ‘produced in 
order to be read and grasped, but rather to be lived
(his emphasis) by people with bodies and lives in 
their own particular context’.48 Similarly, he praises 
the capitals of the Romanesque cloister (and note 
that these are sculptural), since even though they 
may be different in their details, these differences 
operate ‘within the limits permitted by a model’.49
In encountering here these vaguely moralising 
pronouncements - tinted by an historical nostalgia 
that one ﬁ nds in neither Hegel nor Heidegger - it is 
clear that the author has only taken into considera-
tion the vacuation of philosophy from architecture in 
Hegel and not the more complex entanglements of 
the two disciplines in Hegel’s writings. 
11.
What is it about architecture that - philosophically 
speaking - degenerates into a discourse of its 
ina dequacies? It is, as we have seen, not simply its 
association with capitalism, bourgeois profession-
alism, and industrial consumerism. These are just 
the modern-day predicates in an equation between 
architecture and modernity that begins somewhere 
else. 
To answer the question more fully, one must return 
again to the issue of Umschliessung. At its root is the 
verb Schloss, which can mean something as small 
as a lock or as big as a castle, but in either case 
refers to a mechanical or quasi-mechanical object. 
This term, therefore, from the beginning, puts archi-
tecture at a disadvantage since it is the engagement 
with the human body that, for Hegel, allows the 
Spirit to ﬁ nd its interiority. Yet Umschliessung has 
an important quasi-philosophical meaning. In his 
Vorlesungen, Hegel discusses the word schliessen
(‘to lock’ or ‘to close’) to demonstrate how philoso-
phers can use a ‘symbolic term’ to designate the 
closure of an argument.50 Um-schliessung could 
thus be translated as ‘bringing philosophy to a 
secure enclosing.’ 
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The play on (en)closure in Hegel is now clear. Only 
by having something removed from the discussion, 
namely its empiricism, could architecture - over a 
long period of time - overcome its Vermischung to 
turn inward - to ‘a forgetting of external nature’51 - 
to deﬁ ne the potential for a pure interiority and to 
complete and resolve the movement from one puri-
ﬁ cation to another. Architecture encloses itself in 
the name of philosophy, and in reverse, philosophy 
encloses itself in the name of architecture. Philoso-
phy and architecture bring each other to a close.
12.
Or so it seems.
It is not just Umschliessung’s gerundic nature that 
allows architecture to engage both its history and 
its philosophicalness, it is the striving by architec-
ture to become a ‘totale Umschliessung’, - ‘a totally 
enclosed enclosing’ - that parallels, and fulﬁ ls, the 
complete exclusion [Ausschliessung] of the empiri-
cal that took place at the ‘beginnings’ of architecture. 
It is this striving for completeness that results in the 
architecture of the Christian era having a space that 
is ‘gripped together’ and combined ‘into the most 
secure unity and clearest independence’, even if it 
is partially an illusion.52
Hegel, however, can’t help but noting - as an aside 
- that Umschliessung has a history that transcends 
the philosophical. He states that unlike the medieval 
cathedral, some Protestant churches have regular-
ised seating and placed people in boxes which look 
‘like stalls’ [wie Ställe] in a barn.53 The root of Ställe
is the same as the verb stellen, meaning ‘to place 
something,’ or to immobilise it. Between the nomad-
ism in the Catholic church and the stationariness 
in the Protestant church there is here replayed, for 
Hegel, that ancient shift from primitivism to civili-
sation - from migrant hordes to settled, agrarian 
communities. But it has, architecturally speaking, 
deteriorated into something negative - we might 
call it ‘the modern’ - the apparitions of which ghost 
through Hegel’s book and his writings in the form 
of barbs and asides against the ‘superﬁ ciality’, of 
the times.54 Hegel was, of course, a Lutheran and 
his criticism of the stalls should not be seen as a 
criticism of Protestantism, but as a criticism of an 
architecture that fails to function according to dialec-
tical needs. What can we make of his comment, 
therefore, except to claim that it is nothing short of 
a brief appearance of something unruly outside of 
the dialectic, a force that even the dialectic cannot 
fully control?
Umschliessung transgresses its mandate of 
puriﬁ cation. After all, the stalls are not made by an 
architect, but by a furniture maker, which means that 
architecture, in the closing moments of its dialecti-
cal history, and under the nose of the philosophical 
master, winds up vermischt with a lesser art and 
so becomes contingent on something as immate-
rial as a wooden plank. Umschliessung - which can 
take the form of everything from cave walls to stone 
buttressing - moves into its most radical paratactic 
dematerialisation. None of this was intended in the 
narrative of Umschliessung. It was supposed to 
end with the pre-programmed inadequacies of the 
cathedral (with its implied criticism of Catholicism), 
but what happened instead was that enclosing 
leaked out of the system and moved beyond philos-
ophy to take on a life of its own, and, once purged of 
its historical, disciplinary, physical, and even, in the 
end, its architectural prerogatives, it did not listen to 
its philosophical instructions. 
There are two places, Hegel intimates, where 
this is evident, in the debasing stalls of a Protestant 
church and in the gardens of the French kings where 
walls are formed by bushes. Both are mentioned in 
the lecture without any indication of how they ﬁ t into 
the broader discussion. 
Trees are planted in a strict order besides one 
another in long avenues, they are trimmed, and 
real walls are formed from the cut hedges; and in 
this way nature itself is transformed into a vast resi-
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dence under the open sky.55
Umschliessung - no longer a philosophical project 
but something that is applicable in more neutral 
circumstances - becomes vermischt with what we 
might today call interior architecture, on the one 
hand, and with landscape architecture, on the other 
hand. In these conditions, architecture, from a philo-
sophical point of view, is condemned to irrelevance 
- and this was certainly Hegel’s reason for ﬁ nishing 
the history of architecture in this way. 
However, perhaps something else has taken 
place. Architecture has escaped the conﬁ nements 
of philosophy and disguised itself - and thus learned 
to protect itself - in the thematics of its messy origins. 
Unlike the other arts, which are carried along by the 
dialectic into the ethereal realm of high culture and 
metaphysical purpose, architecture moves onward 
into a more vacuous history free from philosophical 
oversight. Architecture, existing in a state of philo-
sophical abandonment, becomes an easy target for 
philosophical punishment.
13.
The desire to see past architecture, to charge it with 
a history that is for all practical purposes extrinsic 
to its assignment, but that threatens to become its 
very essence, imparts to architecture an energy that 
deﬁ nes its philosophical credibility, but that also, in 
the end, confuses its philosophical host. Umschlies-
sung - from the beginning - was, however, not pure 
philosophy, but a philosophy-in-historical-transla-
tion, given that it was designed as an embrace of 
the temporal, as a way to move the history of Spirit 
along and to bind together disparate realities. It is 
not connected to human effort, which are the traits 
associated with the higher arts, and as such it cannot 
be framed in empirical terms. It thus moves past its 
philosophically-mandated enclosures to become an 
autonomous force, to stand on a threshold between 
architecture and philosophy. Umschliessung is thus 
a ‘not-architecture’, but neither is it pure philosophy. 
It is vermischt with temporality, and this predicts - 
from the beginning - architecture’s transitoriness in 
a philosophical narrative.
14.
The history of Umschliessung has two tracks 
through Hegelian time. On the one, just discussed, 
it leaks past the boundaries set for it; its symbolic 
past erupts into new Vermischungen that guarantee 
its alienation and yet independence from philosoph-
ical mandates. It demarcates a space of activity that 
is part philosophical, part a-philosophical. 
On the other side, when still locked inside the 
enclosures of philosophy, it turns against its master. 
Schliessen, as Hegel himself explains, is a word 
that when used by a philosopher, is not trapped by 
the literalness of the word. Its symbolic past has 
‘been forgotten’. This means that in order for the 
philosophical to come to a close, it has to force archi-
tecture to follow philosophy’s footsteps - to forget 
its roots not only in nature, but also in its symbolic 
history. As a result the cathedral can only become 
a totale Umschliessung, when its exteriority is no 
longer relevant, and indeed the architecture of the 
great cathedrals ‘give effect to the forgetting of the 
exterior world of nature and the distracting activities 
and interests of ﬁ nite existence’.56 At its beginnings, 
Umschliessung was one-sided, just the inside of a 
cave; at its endings, it is one-sided again. The long 
struggle to bring inside and outside into relationship 
is over; the outside, in essence, looses. 
There is, however, a consequence of this forget-
ting; the exterior of the cathedral begins ‘to have an 
independence of its own, because it has tasks of its 
own to fulﬁ l’.57 In the name of the dialectic, a new 
medium is born, the façade that signals architec-
ture’s inadequacy with respect to the philosophical; 
it also signals the end of philosophy’s commitment 
to architecture at the moment it becomes urban.
This delamination of exterior and interior is, of 
course, predicted by the dialectic in which interiority 
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- becoming the subject of its own expression - devel-
ops an ‘exteriorless expression’ [äusserlichkeitslose 
Äusserung] which can be translated as ‘an external-
ized expression with no externality as such’. In this 
sense, externality is released from its philosophical 
clamps. It ‘no longer has content [Inhalt] or purpose 
[Zweck]’58 and becomes, in fact, potentially ‘indiffer-
ent and vulgar’.59 It is this separation that is meant 
by a totale Umschliessung. 
But the problem is that starting as an attempt to 
reign in Äusserlichkeit - to turn architecture, implau-
sibly, inwards - Umschliessung winds up producing 
Äusserlichkeit as such. Architecture exists now as a 
double phenomenon, deﬁ ning interiority in the name 
of the dialectic, but wedded to an exteriority that 
- though created by the dialectic - wants a history 
freed from philosophical management. Separated 
at the beginning from the empirical, architecture 
is now separated from the philosophical, and this 
means that it has, by deﬁ nition, no history. The 
façade, a necessary by-product of architecture’s 
dialectical advancement, lives its life as yet another 
symptom of the falsity that the dialectic can see, but 
is powerless to transform.
What began as a redemption of architecture in the 
name of history winds up producing an art form with 
no history. What began as a crisis of its materiality 
ends as a crisis of its superﬁ ciality. What began as 
a claim for a new context for the understanding of 
architecture ends up placing architecture in conﬂ ict 
with its urban potential. Form and meaning drift 
apart and can from now on encounter each other 
only as enemies.
15.
Though Umschliessung was intended to be seen in 
a positive sense as the production of a safe haven 
for the activities within, it is also ‘a locking up’ or 
‘a locking in’ - in an eighteenth century dictionary 
its Italian equivalent was given as chiasura - and 
as such has no entrances and exits; it is, precisely, 
total. In the early eighteenth century, when the 
term Umschliessung ﬁ rst became current, it was 
used principally as a military concept in the context 
of urban fortiﬁ cations.60 This inherent militancy is 
implied not only in the constraining stalls of the Prot-
estant church, but also in the requirements placed 
on sculpture, which is, of course, all about stationary 
objects. Hegel begins his discussion on sculpture 
by noting that though sculpture has ‘emancipated 
itself from its architectural purpose’, it must retain ‘a 
permanent relation with spaces formed architectur-
ally’.61 A sculpture, for Hegel, cannot be considered 
outside of its context. Sculpture begins its history 
by being ‘put in its place’. Like a good soldier or 
good servant, it can only be comprehended when 
properly disciplined.
The reason is clear, unlike architecture which has 
a history, according to Hegel, devoid of craftsmen, 
sculpture is the ﬁ rst art where the Spirit demon-
strates the skill of making. The real story of the Spirit 
thus begins here, and there is much at stake. Archi-
tecture, because it is conceptual and without agency 
- is thus called on to enforce the contextualism of 
sculpture. Hegel tries to carry the positive aspects 
of this exchange forward, but it is clearly driven 
more by the compulsion for the logic of enclosure 
than by the nobility of Spirit. Umschliessung has to 
be ‘total’ so that sculpture cannot escape the gaze 
of philosophy. What philosophy allows architecture 
cannot be permitted the presumed higher arts.62
16.
Unlike philosophers who can ‘forget’ the symbolic 
underpinnings of what it means to ‘lock up an argu-
ment,’ the architecture-of-Umschliessung cannot. 
Its root violence is never far from mind. The word 
thus points to both the consciousness of its asso-
ciation with the philosophical and to its literalness. 
Separating nature on the outside and art on the 
inside, it does not allow the Spirit out of its protected 
containment. The church entombs the dialectic; it 
becomes nothing less than die Umschliessung des 
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Geistes.63 It becomes not an ephemeral substance 
that ﬂ oats elegantly through history transforming 
mud, stone and bricks into various philosophical 
‘enclosures’, but an agent in its own right. It marches 
across the borders of the chapter on architecture to 
assist the dialectic in mastering sculpture, whereas 
back home, in the cathedrals, it forcibly puriﬁ es 
itself of sculpture, by ‘breaking ornamentation apart 
and rendering it into little pieces [zerstückeln]’, 
and spreading it over its surfaces.64 In that sense, 
architecture at its most remote and dispassionate 
- standing back from the play of metaphysics, and 
having seemingly exhausted itself in its grandiose 
forms - becomes cruel and inhibitory.
17.
The dialectic produces architecture as the alienated 
subject - one that is either unhinged from the philo-
sophical or untamed by it. 
Architecture, touched by the wand of philoso-
phy, can still continue, however, to claim for itself a 
civilisational cause, but only by disguising its philo-
sophically - or repressed - predicted inadequacies 
in this respect. Of all the arts, architecture is the 
only one that is post-metaphysical. It had once been 
enclosed within the horizon of the metaphysical, but 
now exists stripped of metaphysical purpose. Here 
lies the problem of where to locate the ‘theory’ of 
modern architecture.
18.
In Hegel, architecture or rather its equivalent, ‘not-
architecture’ survives as part ﬁ ction, part fact, part 
freedom-creating, part freedom-denying, and part 
church, part prison. The theme of enclosure that 
binds this history to philosophy and that imprisons it 
in its own cunning carries through in Heidegger, but 
in reverse. On the surface, there is an uncanny simi-
larity between, on the one hand, Hegel’s Protestant 
churchgoer, contained in his stall, and its dialectic 
opposite, the ‘nomads’, wandering about in the nave 
of a Catholic cathedral, and, on the other hand, 
Heidegger’s onto-centric Bauer and his dialectical 
opposite, the ‘rootless’ truck driver. In both cases, 
the philosophical ﬁ ghts against the spectre of motion 
and staticness while at the same time having to 
establish itself purposefully - and cunningly - as a 
discourse that itself moves through an illusory and 
artiﬁ cial history in search of the stable. 
On the surface, however, Heidegger had intended 
to go past Hegel given that his philosophical 
Destruktion was meant to bring us into sight of a 
bauen that produces a new unity of the physical and 
the social. Architecture was not seen as the frame - 
and (en)closure - of philosophy, but in direct lineage 
with Being itself. However, since it was many 
times removed from Being, the redeeming force 
of language - as it slips and slides its way into the 
present - turns out to be a slow-acting poison that 
dooms bauen at the very moment it becomes not 
quasi-historical but empirically historical. The ﬁ ction 
that was meant to show that there was an alterna-
tive to architecture, namely bauen, embeds within 
it - albeit unwittingly - the legitimacy of architecture 
itself, which, like a virus, has learned to survive in 
unfriendly conditions; it infects and ultimately under-
mines Being, entering the system unnoticed already 
at the ﬁ rst linguistic break from bin to bhu. 
Architecture, though ostensibly that which is a 
negative associated with urban life - note that the 
philosophies of both Hegel and Heidegger are anti-
urban - begins a type of production in the form of 
an alienation from the philosophical, but the philo-
sophical bauen has a history that ends only with 
bauen and thus can never be anything with physical 
attributes. It is the very opposite of Umschliessung, 
which has any number of material embodiments.
One must remember, in this respect, that whereas 
Immanuel Kant deﬁ ned agere (to make) as separate 
and distinct from opus (a work), Heidegger’s bauen 
(to build) never becomes der Bau (the building). It 
never becomes a thing in dialogue with its making. 
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For Kant opus lay at the core of social existence. It 
allowed judgment to take place and with judgment 
the potential for social advancement and enlight-
enment. Heidegger dispenses with this argument. 
Bauen can never become anything more than an 
activity endlessly reproducing itself. Despite all its 
purported positivities, bauen - cut off from the prin-
ciple of judgment - is at its core afraid that it could 
produce something that could potentially become a 
mere sign of its presence; in other words, bauen can 
never produce an actual building. And in reverse, 
the built object cannot refer back to its maker. ‘When 
we are facing a cathedral’, Heidegger writes, ‘we 
are faced not just with a church, a building, but with 
something that is present, in its presence’.65
Though architecture as such, for Heidegger, is 
insufﬁ cient to explain the presence of buildings phil-
osophically, bauen – by its own devices - is unable to 
explain the not-architecture that it hopes to produce. 
It can do little more than push its production in front 
of it and away from it, reinstating again and again 
the very thing that it purports to challenge, namely 
architecture. But because the gulf between bauen
and der Bau is unbreachable, and because archi-
tecture can, in fact, produce things regardless of 
how we evaluate them, bauen remains unrequited. 
Like a ghost, it can haunt the system, but it cannot 
touch it, much less bend it to its ambitions. Bauen
is locked out - the word Ausgeschlossen comes to 
mind - from any viable contact with architecture. In 
other words, bauen and the prosaic empiricism of 
architectural objects stand on the same ground of 
exclusion. 
19.
Bauen and Umschliessung close each other off. 
Both, in different ways, can only produce their 
own activity without referentiality. Umschliessung, 
however, moves from material to material, and is, 
in comparison to bauen, an unwanted - or perhaps 
one can say ‘accidental’ - dialectical manifestation 
of the unsettled modernity. Bauen has no material-
ity at all, and thus, though it avoids the problem of 
insubstantiation, can only levitate as an unrequited 
desire, inﬂ icting pain onto everything that it is not.
20.
A philosophy today that critiques architecture fails 
to realise that architecture is a self-constructed 
projection of the Enlightenment fascination with 
an alienation that it cannot explain. Post-Hegelian 
philosophy can thus chastise architecture for its 
superﬁ ciality - as an extension of its philosophical 
beginnings - while also taking it to task for its cruelty, 
the cruelty of enclosure itself - as an extension of 
its philosophical endings. Post-Hegelian philosophy 
thus always wants to either set limits for architecture 
- in response to the former - or continue to deform it 
- in response to the latter. Even Adorno relishes the 
double trap in which architecture - after Hegel - is 
destined to fall again and again. 
If out of disgust with functional forms and their 
inherent conformism, it [architecture] wanted to give 
free reign to fantasy, it would fall immediately into 
kitsch.66
This sentence is not about architecture. It is philos-
ophy (mis)recognising its failure to incorporate the 
a-dialectical in its discursive machinery. 
21.
But now (i.e. after Heidegger) there is no hidden 
external concept that can be called upon to redeem 
architecture from its travail. The trap has been 
closed. The battle is over. Architecture cannot 
escape the humiliations and dialectical negativi-
ties that have over time come to deﬁ ne it. Nor can 
philosophy now bring it to heel. Architecture exists 
as a reconstituted negation of itself, meaning that 
there is simply no further depth to which criticism 
can reach. Jean Baudrillard can write that the Beau-
bourg in Paris is ‘a monument to mass simulation’, 
‘a carcass’, ‘a mausoleum’, and ‘a cadaver’.67 But 
the last laugh is on him. Is this not the nightmare 
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that haunts Hegel’s cathedral, replete with its ‘empty 
interior’ and ‘space of deterrence’?
One comes to the conclusion, as awkward as it 
may be, that architecture comes into view at the 
very moment that its detachment from the progress 
of Spirit in Hegel - enclosed in a philosophical 
dialectic and yet ungrounded both in the history of 
the past and in the history of the present - becomes 
its alienated re-attachment to itself. The double 
bind of architecture has become a double negation. 
What was meant to be a harmless by-product of 
the dialectical imagination now tortures Being into 
powerlessness. Architecture becomes the fetish of 
philosophy.
22.
All in all, the story of architecture (and its associ-
ated ‘history’ and ‘theory’), when viewed from this 
perspective, is a desperate one. From the early 
nineteenth century onward, it was seen philosophi-
cally as a limited form of consciousness that has 
been transcended by the other arts. But it was, in 
actuality, working in a post-philosophical status 
(unbeknownst to the philosophers), subsuming its 
lack of importance into the body of its production. 
This was the pathology that was to play itself out 
again and again, and that uniﬁ es all architectural 
production to this day. Not even modernism, despite 
its anti-historicism, could redeem architecture from 
its accumulated negativities. Functionalism was not 
a liberation, but all that was left over in the dying days 
of the Hegelian spectre, its premise already contam-
inated by the Hegelian demotion of architecture to 
the extended labours of Zweckmässigkeit. And yet, 
like a force of nature, architecture, ﬁ rst abandoned 
and then maligned, ﬁ rst given over to its passiv-
ity and then to its pathology, managed to survive, 
but now - and as long as there is philosophy - as a 
double negation. Perhaps the Beaubourg attracted 
so much ire from Baudrillard because it is a build-
ing that actually provokes the naïve negativities that 
are latently possible in the Hegelian-Heideggerian 
world to enclose enclosure, while at the same time 
fulﬁ ling the very premises that Hegel put into play, 
namely that of an architecture/not-architecture.
Architecture - after Heidegger - is a negative 
tautology.
23.
And so today, we stand before the uncertainty of 
what architecture is and, more speciﬁ cally, of archi-
tecture’s singularity, where the word ‘architecture’ 
when written alone in a sentence survives to indi-
cate a space of practice that obscures something 
that is neither a singular nor a plural. To solve 
the problem, architecture - in a state of dialectical 
abandonment in philosophy - needs to be paired 
with architecture itself in the equation: ‘architec-
ture/architecture’. This equation is not a demand 
for a new type of architecture, but a description of 
architecture as it exists today in the lost intersec-
tion between time and space, between an uncertain 
history and an uncertain future. The duality of the 
words points to architecture’s various tautological 
multiples. And, because it is split against itself, the 
equation points to the repression of one word by the 
other, and to the latent history of not-architecture. 
Unlike the deforming energy of the translation from 
bin to bauen that left one at best with an ephem-
eral ‘poetics’ with its pretences of science and rigor, 
a more properly ‘deforming translation’, to use the 
words of Jacques Derrida, starting with Hegel’s 
architecture of cunning ends at a point where archi-
tecture can bring out of hiding its underlying dialectic 
of impossibility.68 In this way we can protest against 
the attempts to erase, forget, deny, if not overtly 
obliterate architecture’s historical and theoretical 
unsituatedness in post-Enlightenment thought.
This doubling of architecture - this building on 
and inversion of the double negative - allows archi-
tecture to re-enter the philosophical, but in a way 
that protects it from the philosophical compulsion 
to begin the discussion through a replication of 
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the negation. Kant asks how do we judge judging. 
Hegel makes it clear that it is not history that he 
is interested in but the history-of-history. Similarly 
Nietzsche asks not what value is, but what is ‘the 
value of value?’. Heidegger asks, what is the being-
of-being? This doubling - an architecture all its own 
- brings both criticism and its object into alignment, 
thus reﬂ ecting both the strength and weakness of 
modern philosophy. Would it not be right to integrate 
this architectural ideogram into architectural specu-
lation - the architecture of architecture - for it would 
allow us to see architecture’s history as a signiﬁ er of 
philosophy’s cunning in the context of architecture’s 
modernity. 
24.
My interest in these remarks is to reinvest critical 
discourse about architecture with something more 
than an appreciation of architecture’s numerous 
disciplines, its technical masteries, its design virtu-
osities, or even the assumption that a presumed 
avant-garde holds the key to architecture’s purpose. 
Rather, I claim that architecture cannot escape from 
the cunning that gave it the complex set of rules-
of-engagement by which it came to develop its 
cultural activities. I want to re-establish the primacy 
of that particular history to architecture, awaken 
it to its hidden dialectic, by which I mean, once 
again, not that architectural history (the discipline) 
holds the key to understanding architecture, but 
that architecture exists only by means of a histori-
cal function that is equivalent to the complex terms 
of its lack of historical relevance as a philosophical 
project. Having been attached to - and indeed made 
equivalent with - philosophy’s higher aims and then, 
simultaneously, detached from these aims, archi-
tecture had to situate itself as best it could within the 
frameworks of existing disciplinary structures; it also 
gave itself over to the mandates of its philosophi-
cal (dis)associations. And yet today - located in the 
shadow of both Hegel and Heidegger - that which 
we call architecture exists in a limbo of not being 
truly alive and yet not ever being quite dead. It is in 
this context that we should seek both a theory and 
practice (and even the history) of architecture.
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